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Governments fighting terrorists have many tactical options, yet these options often yield unintended
and counterproductive consequences. This paper models a terrorist organization, a religious group
from which the terrorists recruit suicide bombers, and the society in which the terrorists are embedded.
The model illuminates how the choice of anti-insurgent tactics influences the incidence of attacks,
paying particular attention to the direct and indirect (unintended) consequences of the government’s
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Wars involve di!c u l tc h o i c e s . N o w h e r ei st h i sm o r ee v i d e n tt h a ni nﬁ g h t i n g
terrorists who commit acts of violence such as suicide attacks against civilians
in pursuit of political or other objectives. Governments and other counterter-
rorist agents have many preemptive and deterrent options to consider, and each
possible tactic can produce a dierent kind of externality (Arce and Sandler
2005). Yet, determining the best tactic or combination of tactics to employ
against terrorist organizations is a complicated problem because the optimal
counterterrorist action depends on the target’s response to the tactics and on
the scope and scale of indirect and unintended consequences. These factors,
in turn, depend upon the structure of the terrorist organization and the nature
of the society in which it is embedded. Identifying the best counterterrorist
tactics require the simultaneous consideration of these many factors in their
inherently strategic setting. We present a game theoretic model of a terrorist
organization that specializes in suicide bombings and show how to predict the
terrorists’ reactions to and indirect consequences of counterterrorist eorts,
thereby allowing us to identify optimal counterterrorist actions.
Though there is no standard way to classify counterterrorist activities,
our reading of the military manuals suggests the following categories.1 Attri-
tion tactics focus on capturing or killing enemy combatants and taking steps
to harden targets. In contemporary terms, this means stopping the suicide
1Roberts and Everton (2010), for example, prefer classifying by "kinetic" and "non-
kinetic," while Arce and Sandler (2005) distinguish actions by the externalities they generate.
We relate our classiﬁcation to theirs in Section 5. Alternatively, Kydd and Walter (2006)
classify counterterrorist policies by the terrorist activities they are meant to counter.
2bombers before they strike and hardening infrastructure to reduce damage
done by bomb blasts. Direct action focuses on the opposing organization,
usually by capturing or killing key leaders so that the organization collapses.
Covert action also focuses on the opposing organization, but attempts to dis-
rupt its operations through surreptitious means, rather than killing or captur-
ing key personnel. Civic action focuses on supporters (potential and current)
of an organization. The idea is to oer appealing alternatives in hopes of
inducing the population to cease supporting the insurgents and increasingly
support the government.
The impact of these tactics depends, in part, on how the target responds
to them and on other indirect and unintended consequences. Consider the
following: terrorists traditionally confront attrition by avoiding contact with
superior forces and beginning engagements only when they have a tactical ad-
vantage; they deal with direct action by minimizing communications among
members and concealing key personnel; they resist civic action by attacking
government personnel (such as aid workers, school teachers, and local o!cials),
terrorizing civilian populations, and increasing their own eorts to attract ad-
herents. Attacking terrorist organizations in one direction can push them
in other unanticipated and counterproductive directions (Bueno de Mesquita
2005, Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007). For example, Israeli countert-
error measures such as aerial bombing and economic blockade have inﬂamed
Palestinian public opinion and mobilized support for militants (Bloom 2004).
Israel’s bombing of southern Lebanon strengthened Hezbollah, by degrading
the social and educational services provided by the Lebanese government and
3increasing the population’s reliance on similar services provided by the Islamic
organization. The United States’ military’s tactics during the early stages of
the insurgency in Iraq backﬁred: pursuing terrorists conventionally and then
withdrawing from the ﬁeld protected coalition soldiers from suicide bombings
in the short run but ceded control of the streets to opponents of occupation.
Our model is constructed to account for various counterterrorist options
and the many possible consequences of those options. We here focus on a
terrorist organization that coordinates suicide attacks on civilians, a religious
group from which the terrorist organization recruits suicide attackers, and the
society in which both operates. The model has several salient features. Indi-
viduals choose between participating in a religious group or engaging in secular
activities. Drawing from the economics of religion literature, we model the
beneﬁts that individuals receive from participating in the group’s activities as
positively related to their experience with the group and their allegiance to
the organization. We label these factors group capital. The beneﬁts that indi-
viduals receive from other activities depend on their returns in the workplace.
These returns depend upon individuals education, talents, skills, and experi-
ence. We label these factors human capital. From the religious group, the
terrorist organization recruits combatants, who then conduct suicide missions.
The terrorists try to recruit suicide bombers with high group capital–which
increases the likelihood that they follow through with their task–and high
human capital–which increases the likelihood that they succeed. The cost of
identifying, screening, and motivating suicide bombers varies with the size of
the group. The cost of training the suicide bombers depends upon the candi-
4date’s group and human capital. Combatants with higher religious and human
capital are easier to train and more likely to succeed.
The model’s structure enables us to determine how the government’s tac-
tics inﬂuence the terrorist organization’s ability to launch successful suicide
strikes. We decompose the impact into direct consequences, which hold the
behavior of the population (and all potential combatants) constant, and in-
direct consequences, which are those that occur after the population reacts
to the side-eects of the government’s actions. We also examine the terrorist
organization’s reaction to the government’s tactics and how the government’s
tactical choices change when it takes the insurgent’s reactions into account.
Our model enables us to determine the best way to hinder an organization
from recruiting, training, and motivating suicide bombers. More generally,
we intend for our approach to advance our more general understanding of how
to best identify counterterrorist actions for even more settings.
2 Related Literature
Our model builds on a wide-range of empirical and game theoretic work in
economics, political science, and sociology. We here mention some of the
most relevant sources.
Berman (2003), Iannaccone (2006), and Iannaccone and Berman (2006)
draw theoretical connections between religion and violence. They propose a
club good framework in which voluntary religious organizations provide pub-
lic goods. The sacriﬁces that these groups demand from members make
the groups well suited for solving the extreme principal-agent problems when
5mobilizing militants. In other words, because religious groups, particularly
radical ones, solve defection problems so well, they are well positioned to pro-
duce violence. This logic provides a theoretical connection between religion
and violence.
Berman and Laitan (2006), Berman and Laitan (2008), and Berman (2009)
examine empirical evidence of the above theoretical link. The ﬁrst shows that
suicide attacks are favored by the radically religious. Radical religious clubs
choose suicide terrorism more often and are unusually eective at it. Sui-
cide attacks are chosen when targets are hard to destroy without high risk of
capture. The club model emphasizes the function of radical religious organi-
zations as providers of benign local public goods. The second article presents
evidence that missions organized by radical religious clubs that provide be-
nign local public goods in the absence of competing provision by government
are both more lethal and are more likely to be suicide attacks than missions
organized by other terrorist groups with similar aims and theologies. Suicide
attacks are chosen when targets are "hard," i.e., di!cult to destroy. The ﬁnal
reference is a recent book that brings all of the above together.
Sandler and Arce (2003) and Sandler and Siqueira (2009) survey the game
theoretic work on terrorism. Such work is concerned with the allocation of
counterterrorism resources across potential targets, allocation across preemp-
tive and deterrent activities, the inﬂuence of domestic politics, the role of
informational asymmetries, and more. A few papers are particularly relevant
for our purposes because they link terrorist recruitment with counterterrorist
activities and the larger social setting. Inspired in part by Frey and Luechinger
6(2003), Arce and Sandler (2005) emphasize the dierence between preemptive
and deterrence counterterrorist strategies, showing that the latter is generally
chosen even though the former yield wider beneﬁts and positive externalities.
In a model that captures public support for terrorism and terrorist recruitment,
Faria and Arce (2005) show that focusing on liberal ideals such as reducing
repressing and improving economic opportunities are eective at reducing ter-
rorism. By centering attention on how the counterterrorist activities aect
recruiting through various channels, they can characterize the optimal level of
counterterrorism policies. Bueno de Mesquita (2005) argues that government
crackdowns may increase or decrease support for terrorism, depending on the
relative eects of counterterrorism on economic opportunity, ideology, and the
success of terrorist organizations. This model reconciles two seemingly contra-
dictory empirical ﬁndings: terrorist operatives typically have above-average
educations and incomes, yet poverty and recessions are positively correlated
with terrorism.
Our analysis relies upon on a number of stylized facts about suicide bomb-
ings established by earlier studies. First, support for suicide bombings ap-
pears independent of socio-demographic and economics variables (Krueger and
Maleckova 2003), though the tactic is favored by groups associated with cer-
tain forms of religion (Moghadam 2008). This suggests that factors unrelated
to economic conditions also matter in an individual’s decision to participate.
Second, suicide bombings increase in frequency during bad economic times
(see discussion in Bueno de Mesquita 2005), which suggests that economic
conditions also matter. Finally, insurgent organizations typically recruit in-
7dividuals with above-average educations and high human capital. Insurgents
prefer high-skilled individuals because they are easier to train and more eec-
tive as operatives (Krueger and Maleckova 2003, Berrebi 2003).
We acknowledge that no simpliﬁed model can account for all features of
terrorist organizations and the settings in which they recruit and conduct sui-
cide attacks. For example, terrorist groups vary in their motives and levels of
militancy, thus creating additional information asymmetries (Arce and San-
dler 2007; Arce and Sandler 2010). Yet, we constructed our model to capture
many of aspects of actual terrorist groups’ operations as identiﬁed by Cren-
shaw (2007). Suicide attacks occur in larger strategic social settings, loyalty to
a group can enhance the individual’s commitment to follow through on terror-
ist acts, and many of these groups have a religious association. Our approach
falls more generally in the category of economic approaches to studying terror-
ism (Enders and Sandler 2005; Intriligator 2010) but diers from these earlier
works in important ways: we focus on a wide range of intervention options
that can be used to deter the terrorist organization; our analysis is formal and
analytic; and we have the express goal of producing a tractable framework
in which to study the behavior or governments, terrorists and insurgents, and
their populations.
3M o d e l
Our model examines a typical recruitment situation. A set of individuals
form a population, and a subset of those individuals comprise a group that
provides religious and social services for group members. The quality of the
8group’s services depends on the members’ group capital and the eorts they
expend on group production. We model the group as a religious club, along
the lines of Iannaccone and Berman, because these organizations often serve
as recruiting grounds for suicide bombers. We note, however, that the group
n e e dn o tb er e l i g i o u sper se, though we believe that the religious context helps
us sharpen focus. The crucial assumption is that the group produces nonrival
but excludable services (i.e. club goods) using group-speciﬁc human capital.
These characteristics ﬁt a wide range of organizations that support terrorist
activities.
The terrorist organization recruits individuals from the religious club to be-
come suicide bombers. Suicide bombers operate individually, strike once, and
then cease activity. The ﬁnality of these singular strikes simpliﬁes our model,
but the nature of the mission could be changed without loss of generality.
The government, which will be treated exogenously for simplicity, can inter-
vene to aect the incidence of attacks. The terrorists, the suicide bomber, the
religious club, and the population at large may respond to the government’s
choice of tactics.
3.1 Individuals and Religious Group Production
An individual is deﬁned by two traits: her level of group capital, nl,a n dh e r
level of human capital, kl. An ordered pair, (nl>k l)> deﬁnes an individual’s
type. For simplicity, we treat both aspects of an individual’s type to be
exogenous.
An individual has one unit of a resource (such as time or eort) to allocate
9between group and secular activities. Let gl 5 [0>1] be the amount of resource
allocated to group devotion and 1  gl be the amount devoted to secular
activities. In the religious setting, devotion may correspond to study at the
group’s school, attendance at group services, or participation in other group
events.
Each individual l chooses gl to maximize her utility function
xl (gl)=
½
] (gl|kl>)>g ? G >
J(nl>>G)+] (gl|kl>) g  G=
] (gl|kl>\) is individual l’s secular beneﬁts, which is decreasing in her re-
sources allocated to devotion gl but increasing in her human capital kl and
in an exogenous parameter . We also assume that the cross-partial deriv-
ative with respect to gl and kl is negative: the loss in secular beneﬁts from
an increase in religious devotion gl decreases as kl increases. The exogenous
parameter  captures anything, such as the extent of the secular marketplace
or set of secular commodities, that positively alters her secular beneﬁts while
holding all else constant. These shift parameters will capture the inﬂuence of
particular counterterrorist activities to be described later. We assume that
the cross partial derivative between  and gl is also negative. Parameter G
will be described below.
We operationalize these assumptions in the following condition:
Condition 1 (a) Secular beneﬁts equal zero if gl =1 : ] (gl =1 )=0 .
(b) Secular beneﬁts strictly decrease and are dierentiable in gl: ]g ? 0.
(c) Secular beneﬁts strictly increase and are dierentiable in kl and :
]k A 0 and ] A 0.
10(d) For secular beneﬁts, the cross-partial with respect to kl and gl is neg-
ative, ]gk ? 0,a si st h ec r o s s - p a r t i a lw i t hr e s p e c tt o and gl, ]g ? 0.
J(nl>>G) is individual l’s beneﬁts of religious group participation. As
mentioned in the literature review above, religious groups are clubs providing
excludable club goods, and because of the positive externalities in club good
production, a group must solve the free-rider problem to provide beneﬁts to its
members. Our J function draws from this conception of a religious group and,
in particular, from Iannaccone’s (1992; 1994) work. The group confronts the
free-rider problem by having a minimum level of observable devotion, denoted
G, that any individual must meet in order to obtain the beneﬁts of group
membership. If an individual devotes less than the minimum (g?G ), then
she is not admitted into the group, and she receives no group beneﬁts even
if she exerts some devotion. If her devotion meets or exceeds the minimum
(g  G), then she is admitted into the group and she receives group beneﬁts.
As in the theory, the minimum level G serves as a screening device thereby
altering the quality of the religious goods. First, by screening out less-
committed individuals, it raises the average commitment level and decreases
free-riding, thereby increasing the overall quality of the religious goods. Sec-
ond, by screening out some individuals, it decreases the overall resources of the
group, thereby decreasing the quality of religious goods. We assume that the
ﬁrst eect dominates at low G while the second eect dominates at high G,
thereby making J hump-shaped in G for each individual. The exact beneﬁts
to l will depend on G, but they will also be increasing in her group capital nl
and in parameter , which represents the strength of the ﬁrst factor.
11These condition are formalized as follows:
Condition 2 (a) Religious group beneﬁts are non-negative, J  0,a n de q u a l
to zero if nl =1 , J(0>>G)=0 .
(b) Religious group beneﬁts strictly increase and are dierentiable in nl
and : Jn A 0 and J A 0.
(c) Religious group beneﬁts are strictly concave and twice dierentiable in
G with JG|G=0 A 0, JG|G=1 ? 0,a n dJGG ? 0
3.2 The Recruiter and Suicide Bomber Recruiting
The suicide recruiter cares about the length of time required to identify a
recruit and to train the recruit to become a suicide bomber. For clarity of
expression, we refer to the recruiter as a male and other individuals, includ-
ing the recruit, as female. We also refer to the male recruiter as if he was
a person, though it can also be appropriate to consider the recruiter as an
organization. Both identifying and training the recruit are necessary, and
both are costly. All else equal, the recruiter prefers a shorter length of time
f o re a c h ,h o w e v e r ,t h et i m er e q u i r e df o re a c hd e p e n d so nt h es i z eo ft h eg r o u p
and the characteristics of the recruit.
Drawing from the literature on the characteristics and motivations of sui-
cide bombers, we further suppose that a suicide bomber is more eective at
her mission if she has a high degree of social capital that ties her to the group
and a high degree of human capital that is necessary to carry out the suicide
mission. On the one hand, high group capital is necessary for the recruited
individual to be willing to sacriﬁce herself for the goals of the recruiter and
12group. The social capital provides the motive, commitment, community con-
nectedness that leads the recruit to choose to carry out the mission. On the
other hand, high human capital is necessary for the recruit to have the skills
required to carry out the mission. Human capital provides the knowledge
of explosives and nerves necessary to arrive safely at the designated location
undetected and complete the task.
To capture these notions formally, we make a few assumptions. First,
before selecting which individual to train, the recruiter must exert costly re-
sources discerning the types of all individuals in the group. He must, for
example, follow their daily activities to see that they are above suspicion by
the government, see that their devotion to the recruiter’s cause is su!cient,
etc. Second, after identifying the types of all group members, the recruiter
chooses to recruit that individual who will take the fewest resources to train.
We capture these features of recruiting in the recruiter’s utility function
y = U(P>)  W (nl>k l>)=
U is the time needed to discern the the social and human capital levels of
all group members, and P is the (membership) size of the group. The time
is increasing in group size, UJ A 0. W is the time required to train an
individual of type (nl>k l) to carry out the mission. W is decreasing in nl and
kl. Intuitively, less training is required the larger the individual’s religious
and human capital. Because time is costly for the recruiter, his utility is
decreasing in time.
 and  are shift parameters that cause each entire function to increase
holding all else constant, i.e., U A 0 and W A 0. These parameters, and
13the similar ones in the individual’s utility function, play an important role in
o u ra n a l y s i sa st h e yw i l lb eu s e dt oc a p t u r ed i erent types of intervention.
They will capture channels through which counterterrorist activities aect
the incidence of suicide attacks, including many of those identiﬁed by Frey
and Luechinger (2003) and Faria and Arce (2005). For example, improving
economic conditions or other opportunity costs to participation will increase
 for individuals, while hardening targets will increase  for the recruiter. We
will elaborate on these possibilities below in Section 5.
Because he perfectly discerns the types of all group members and selects
the easiest individual to train, the recruiter’s ﬁnal utility follows automatically
once the group’s composition is complete.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
4.1 Equilibrium
An individual’s choice involves comparing the highest utility when not joining
the group (g?G ) with the highest utility when joining the group (gl  G).
Given that increasing devotion gl decreases her secular utility ],t h eb e s t
devotion gl less than the G is gl =0 . Increasing devotion gl above G also
decreases secular ] but does not aect the group beneﬁts J,s ot h eb e s t
devotion gl g r e a t e rt h a no re q u a lt oG is gl = G. Thus, the best gl is either
14gl =0or gl = G. Joining is optimal if
xl (gl = G)  xl (gl =0 ),
J(nl>>G)+] (gl = G|kl>)  ] (gl =0 |kl>) ,
J(nl>>G)  ] (gl =0 |kl>)  ] (gl = G|kl>)= (1)
Because the right hand side is positive, the inequality holds only if her
group capital nl is su!ciently high. Speciﬁcally, we can deﬁne b n(kl>>>G)





0> if nl ? b n(kl>>>G)>
G> if nl  b n(kl>>>G)=
(2)
We note that b n is increasing in kl. From Condition 1(d), an increase in
kl will increase the second term of the RHS of inequality (1) by less than it
increases the ﬁrst term, thereby implying a rise in the RHS. The LHS does
not change, thus to maintain the equality implied by the deﬁnition of b n,t h e r e
must be a rise in nl.
To match the screening motivation for G,w ea l s om a k ea na d d i t i o n a lr e -
striction that b n is increasing in G. This occurs when JG is su!ciently low or
|]g| is su!ciently high in absolute value. For individuals at the margin, any
increase in religious beneﬁts from an increase in G must be outweighed by the
loss in secular beneﬁts from a similar increase in devotion.
After observing all individuals with nl  b n(kl>>>G) join and all with
nl ? b n(kl>>>G) not join, the recruiter identiﬁes one individual from the set
of those who joined the group to be the recruit. That individual is the one
that gives the recruiter the highest utility (minimizes the total training time).
Let lW denote that recruited individual.
15Summarizing, the equilibrium consists of two parts: a proﬁle of devotion
levels, i.e., gW
l for each l with (nl>k l) according to (2), and the optimal recruit
selection by the recruiter. The following example illustrates.
Example 1. Consider a set of individuals with types uniformly distributed
over [0>1] × [0>1]. The ﬁrst dimension refers to group capital nl,a n dt h e
second dimension refers to human capital kl. For the individual, let J =
nl (G G2) and ] = kl (1  gl) for the individuals. To be consistent with
Conditions 1 and 2, assume gl 5 [0>1], G 5 [0>1], A0,a n d1 ??3.
For the recruiter, let U equal the group’s size, and let W =m a x(1  nlW)
(  nlW)(  klW),w h e r elW is the individual selected to be the recruit, A0>
and A0.T h e p a r a m e t e r  can be thought of as the level of capital needed
to carry out the mission. With A1, some training will always be necessary
because nl and kl are both weakly less than 1. With   1, training might
or might not be necessary depending on who is recruited. Notice that this W
function takes as given that nl and kl are both weakly less than 1.





 kl  kl (1  G)=





Consistent with the more general model, we observe Ce n
Ckl A 0 and Ce n
CG A 0.
Figure 1 depicts an equilibrium when 
3G A 1 and A1. The shaded
area depicts those individuals who joined the group, and the unshaded area is
16those individuals who did not join. The point designated by the dot at (>)
represents the religious and human capital levels needed by an individual to
carry out the suicide mission. Having A1 seems more plausible than
?1 because we suppose that any recruit should require some training. An
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Figure 2 depicts an equilibrium with 
3G ? 1 and A1= In this case, the
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2 = ¤
4.2 Comparative Statics
Before turning to the types of intervention, it is instructive to consider how
various exogenous shocks to the model will aect the equilibrium frequency
of suicide bombings. We distinguish between two types of shocks. The ﬁrst
type of shock is a shift in one of the model’s parameters. There are four
exogenous shift parameters: the secular beneﬁts parameter , the religious
group production parameter , the recruit screening parameter ,a n dt h e
recruit training parameter . We also treat the group’s devotion level G as an
exogenous parameter. The second type of shock is a shift in the distribution
of types. As will be discussed below, a single intervention may imply shifts
in multiple parameters and also shifts in the distribution of types. However,
17before considering these more complicated scenarios, we will ﬁrst consider
single shifts.
Let us ﬁrst consider the eects of shifts in those parameters that aect an
individual’s choice to join or not join the group, i.e., parameters  and .A n
increase in  corresponds to an increase in secular beneﬁts for all human capital
levels which could be caused, for example, by improved economic conditions.
Because ]g ? 0,a ni n c r e a s ei n causes that RHS of inequality (1) to increase,
which implies that b n shifts up for all values of kl, ,a n dG.T h e s i z e o f t h e
religious group decreases, and this has counteracting eects on the frequency
of suicide bombings. The smaller group implies less time spent screening, but
a smaller group also implies that the recruiter will be less likely to ﬁnd an
individual easy to train, thereby suggesting an increase in time training the
recruit. Whether or not the frequency increases will depend on the relative
costliness of screening relative to training. If screening is costly relative to
training, which can be signiﬁed by a high value of , then the ﬁrst eect
dominates and suicide bombings actual increase in frequency.
Figure 3 depicts this scenario with 
3G ? 1 and A1 in the model
from Example 1. The increase from  to 0 increases the slope of b n.T h e
lightly shaded area designates those individuals who join the group in the new
equilibrium, while the darkly shaded area designates those individuals who
join in the old equilibrium but not in the new equilibrium. The left-most dot
is the individual selected in the new equilibrium. If  is very large, then the
decrease in screening time will more than make up for the increased training
time from the point of the view of the recruiter, and the frequency of suicide
18bombings will increase. But if  is very small, then the frequency of bombings
will increase because of the increased training time.
By similar logic, we observe that a decrease in economic opportunities
depicted as a decrease in  will have the opposite eect of an increase in d,a k i n
to moving from 0 to  in Figure 3. Moreover, an increase in the productivity
of religious goods, depicted by an increase in , also has the opposite eect
of an increase in .A n i n c r e a s e i n G has the same eect qualitatively as
an increase in . In all these cases, the exogenous shock directly aects the
individuals’ decisions to join, thereby changing the size and composition of the
group and indirectly aecting the screening and training of recruits. In each
case there are potentially osetting eects on the overall frequency of suicide
bombings.
Shifts in  and  do not aect an individual’s decision to join the group
a n ds od on o ta ect the group’s composition or the recruiter’s selection of
the recruit. They only aect the recruiter’s utility and frequency of suicide
bombings. Anincrease in  or  increases the time spent recruiting or training,
respectively, and decreases the frequency of bombings.
A change in the distribution of types will not change a single type’s opti-
mal decision, though it can alter the group’s composition and the recruiter’s
selection. Individual l still chooses to join according to (2), but the new popu-
lation may now be such that some types no longer exist while others now exist
or some types now exist in more frequency than others. In our model, a shift
in the distribution that does not change the support of types may potentially
aect the group size and, hence, the screening cost to the recruiter, but it will
19not change the type of individual selected nor change the training cost. Only
a shift in the distribution that eliminates a type that would have been selected
will change the identity of the type selected and the training cost.
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0> otherwise.




















Only the relative frequency of types has changed, not the overall population
size. This shift is akin to an even drop in human capital by half of the high
human capital types. Suppose the initial equilibrium with uniform density is
that depicted in Figure 1 and that Figure 4 illustrates the new equilibrium. In
Figure 4, the dark area signiﬁes density 3
2, and the light area signiﬁes density
1
2. In the new equilibrium, the group composition and size is now dierent













































It is straightforward to see that the new group is larger because the mass at
low human capital types is higher. But notice that the type selected by the







20that individual is selected. There is no change in training as compared to the
example in Figure 1. The frequency of suicide bombings decreases due to the
increased time spent screening but not due to any change in training.
Now consider a shift in the distribution so that high capital types are
eliminated. To be concrete, suppose the new distribution is
i (nl>k l)=
½







Again, the overall population size is unchanged; it is the only composition
that has changed. Figure 5 depicts the new equilibrium. Relative to the






now has much lower human capital. The time spent
screening and training both increase, so the frequency of suicide bombings
decreases. If, on the other hand, the new distribution was
i (nl>k l)=
½







so that only high capital types exist, then the group size would shrink but the
identity of the recruit would be the same is in Figures 1 and 3. The frequency
of suicide bombings would increase. We thus see that it is the elimination
of certain types that changes the identity of the recruit and the time spent
training.
5 Types of Intervention and their Consequences
Our primary goal in this paper is to explore the impact of certain types of inter-
vention on the incidence of suicide bombing. Interpreting y as the frequency
of suicide bombings, we suppose that the intervening actor (e.g., government,
21military, etc.) wants to decrease y. We distinguish four broad types of inter-
ventions: direct action, attrition, covert action, and civic action.
5.1 Direct Action
Direct action is the use of direct force to hinder the operations of the terror-
ist organization or eliminate it altogether. Examples include capturing and
punishing leaders in the terrorist organization, disrupting the ability of the ter-
rorist organization to train recruits, bombing the alleged headquarters of the
organization, and so on. In our model, direct action consists of eorts taken
to disrupt the recruiter directly or to decrease the recruiter’s utility without
impacting the choices or utilities of the individuals. An example would be
some action that disrupts the selection or training processes, which would be
manifest as upward shifts in parameters  and , respectively.
Direct action of these forms has no direct eect on an individual’s choice
to join or not join the group; it only lowers the utility of the recruiter. Unless
direct action eliminates the recruiter altogether, its overall eect will largely be
to reduce the incidence of suicide bombings and not eliminate them altogether.
It does not aect the equilibrium choices so much as it does the equilibrium
payos. Of course, if we further assume that the recruiter has an outside
option and, before selecting a recruit, decides whether to recruit or pursue some
outside option, then su!cient direct action can eliminate suicide bombings
altogether. However, that degree of direct action is likely to be very costly,
especially if direct action has very diminishing returns.
Though direct action is aimed at the recruiter, we should consider the pos-
22sibility of direct action indirectly aecting other parameters in the model. For
example, if direct action involves military action with tremendous collateral
damage, then it can have an adverse impact on overall economic conditions,
eectively decreasing . As mentioned earlier, an increase in  has an ap r i o r i
ambiguous eect on the frequency of suicide bombings that can potentially o-
set the intended eect of the direct action. Similarly, suppose military action
is concentrated in areas with low human capital. Then the population density
may change such that the group shrinks in size due to fewer low human capital
individuals, thereby shrinking the screening time but not altering the training
time. Again, the indirect eect may oset the intended direct action.
The important lesson is that for direct action to decrease the frequency of
suicide bombings requires there must be minimal or minor indirect, osetting
consequences. This same lesson will apply to other types of intervention.
5.2 Attrition
Attrition is deﬁned as the use of force or other means to reduce the impact
or success of the suicide bomber’s attempt. Examples include hardening
targets, identifying and stopping potential suicide bombers, or even letting the
bombers complete their missions in the hopes that they will not be replaced.
In our model, attrition might have multiple eects. First, it would lead to
an increase in , all else equal, as it would lengthen the time required to train
a suicide bomber to penetrate a hardened target, avoid detection, and so on.
Second, it might alter the composition of the group if it involves the capture
and detaining of certain individuals or if it hinders the basic environment in a
23way to lower the value of individual’s human capital akin to a drop in .
Reconsider Example 1. A simple hardening of anticipated targets will ef-
fectively lead to an increase in , i.e., an increase in the time and eort required
to train a suicide bomber and a decrease in the frequency of suicide bombings.
However, just as with direct action, there can be indirect consequences, such
as a shift in , that can dampen or oset the intended intervention. As with
direct action, the success of attrition depends on the possible countervailing
eects of indirect eects.
5.3 Covert Action
Covert action involves inﬁltration of the group via informants or undercover
operatives with the purpose of preventing or disrupting the terrorist activities.
The primary ee c to fs u c ha c t i o ni no u rm o d e li st oi n c r e a s et h es e a r c hc o s tf o r
the recruiter, represented by an increase in . The recruiter must exert more
resources in identifying good candidates and ensure they are not or will not
cooperative with the government. This leads to a reduction in the frequency
of the suicide bombings. It is also possible that covert action increases the
chances of trained recruits being caught, which would imply that more eorts
must be exerted to train a successful recruit. This eect would be represented
as an increase in , which acts to reduce the frequency of suicide attacks.
5.4 Civic Action
Civic action refers to attempts to work with the community, such as enhancing
democracy, improving relations with citizens, educating the public, supporting
community endeavors, constraining or limiting religion, and more. Civic
24action may take many dierent forms in our model. First consider changes in
particular parameters. Civic action aimed at improving the overall economic
environment for individuals will increase , while civic action with the opposite
intent will decrease . As discussed above, the shift in  has potentially
counteracting eects on the screening and training of recruits. Civic action
might instead focus on the religious group. Subsidizing the activities of the
religious group will increase the production of religious goods for all levels of
G,c a p t u r e db ya ni n c r e a s ei n. Conversely, hindering the eorts of religious
groups would eectively decrease . In our model, parameters  and  work
in opposite directions, i.e., an increase in  has the same qualitative eect
in equilibrium as a decrease in . A policy banning head scarves in public
places, for example, could work to decrease the secular opportunities  for
those dedicated to wearing them. Again, we observe potentially counteracting
eects on the screening and training of recruits. Another eort might be aimed
at increasing the group’s minimum level of devotion G. While this would seem
to be under the control of the group, the actual costs of such devotion might be
at least partially determined by the larger social environment akin to how the
tension between a religious group and its surrounding society depends both on
the behaviors and beliefs of the religious group and those of the larger society.
An increase in G will shrink the group’s size and make screening easier, but
it will also increase the training cost because higher human capital individual
will not join.
Civic action may also lead to changes in the distribution of types. Policies
that successfully increase human capital in the population, for example, would
25lead individuals to switch out of the group. But this might have the eect of
decreasing the screening time for the recruiter su!ciently so as to increase the
frequency of suicide bombings. Alternatively, eorts to raise G could have
the unintended consequence that the smaller group actually generates higher
religious capital in its members. Such a shift in the composition of members’
capital would partially oset the increased training cost associated with a rise
in G.
5.5 Other Classiﬁcations
Comparing our classiﬁcation with others made in the literature is instructive.
Arce and Sandler (2005) distinguish preemptive and deterrence counterterror-
ist policies. The former hinder the overall operations of the terrorist orga-
nization, thereby generating a type of positive externality in a setting with
multiple potential targets or multiple intervening bodies (i.e., countries). The
latter provide a more private beneﬁt for one potential target or country. In
our terminology, direct action, covert action, and civic action are all forms of
preemptive policy in that they reduce the overall eectiveness of the terror-
ist organization. Some forms of attrition are preemptive, such as identifying
potential suicide attackers before the attacks, while other forms of attrition,
like hardening targets, are deterrence. The possibility of externalities creates
additional beneﬁts for preemptive policies because all potential targets beneﬁt,
and we will revisit this point below when discussing optimal policies. The
externalities also create additional strategic elements not considered in our
paper because the intervening body is a sole actor rather than a collection of
26actors. This preemptive-deterrence distinction is central to Arce and Sandler’s
analysis because of their focus on how those externalities inﬂuence the choice
of counterterrorist policy. Our distinctions are more useful for us because of
our focus on how the counterterrorist policies inﬂuence group formation and
the recruitment process.
Roberts and Everton (2010) distinguish between kinetic and non-kinetic
counterterrorist activities. The former are aggressive measures, such as cap-
turing or eliminating terrorists or training security forces; the latter are more
subtle and non-coercive means and include civic assistance and psychological
operations. Direct action, attrition, and covert action as we conceive them
are kinetic activities. Civic action is non-kinetic. Again, our distinctions
are more useful for our purposes because they distinguish how the dierent
actions aect group formation and recruitment.
6 Designing Intervention
It is apparent from the previous section that an intervention aimed at reduc-
ing the incidence of suicide bombings may have numerous indirect eects that
reduce the impact of the original intervention. That fact, combined with the
recognition that any intervention will entail the use of scarce resources with
opportunity costs, suggests that the best approach to reducing the suicide
bombings may be a particular mix of dierent interventions. However, with-
out knowing the recruiter technology, religious group composition, and budget
constraint of the intervening body, we cannot provide a precise recommenda-
tion. We instead ﬁrst discuss some properties of an "ideal" intervention and
27then oer some conditional statements about the optimal selection of a mix of
interventions.
6.1 Properties of an Ideal Intervention
Our earlier discussion identiﬁes how changes in particular variables or in the
distribution of types in the population aect the incidence of suicide bombings.
In particular, a reduction in suicide bombings, holding all else equal, follows
from:
• an increase in the secular returns  to human capital;
• a decrease in the returns to religious group participation ;
• an increase in the screening cost ;
• an increase in the training cost ;
• a decrease in the correlation between religious group capital nl and hu-
man capital kl in the population’s distribution.
An ideal intervention (or intervention mix) would do one or more of the
above without unintended or countervailing eects. It would increase all
individuals’ secular opportunities, decrease their returns to religious group
participation, make it more di!cult for the recruiter to identify and train
good candidates, and alter the make-up of the population so that there were
no individuals with both high human capital and high group capital. All of
these work in the appropriate direction. Noticeably absent from this list is a
28change in the screening cost G because that alone has an ambiguous eect on
the incidence of suicide bombings.
None of the interventions mentioned in the previous section met all of these
conditions. Direct action, attrition, and civic action all had the potential to
raise unintended consequences that work against the purpose of the inter-
v e n t i o n . T h eo n l yi n t e r v e n t i o nt h a td i dn o ta p p e a rt oh a v ea n yu n i n t e n d e d
consequences was covert action, which is both very di!cult and costly because
it is both highly specialized and very risky. Whether or not a government or
military’s optimal intervention consists solely of covert action would depend,
of course, on the marginal impact of such action and the relevant resource con-
straints, and this is ultimately an empirical question. In general, however, it
appears that the optimal intervention given the intervening actor’s constraints
will consist of a multi-pronged approach.
6.2 Two Cases
If no single action matches the ideal, then the constrained optimal interven-
tion will involve selecting multiple actions, some of them intended, in part, to
counter the eects of unintended consequences of other actions. If the inter-
vention designer has complete information about all functions and parameters
of the game, then the optimal intervention is found by solving a maximization
problem. We can, however, make statements if we make assumptions about
the sizes of certain parameters.
Case 1: A A(high marginal cost of training). In this scenario,
the marginal cost of training recruits is very high but the screening and selec-
29tion costs are not. For example, it might be easy to spot those characteristics
that make a good, reliable suicide recruit, but carrying out the mission re-
quires highly specialized skills that must be learned by the recruit at a high
cost to the recruiter. We observe in this case that a reduction in the size
of the religious group reduces the recruiter’s screening cost but yields a much
larger increase in the training cost, thereby reducing the frequency of suicide
bombings. Moreover, unintended consequences that result in a shrinking of
the group’s size will work in the intervening body’s favor.
We can now reassess the viability of particular types of intervention. For
example, with a relatively high marginal cost of training, the potentially coun-
teracting eects of an increase in the returns to secular opportunities will bal-
ance in favor of a reduction in the frequency of suicide bombings. The best
candidates to be suicide bombers (i.e., those easiest to train) will shift out
of the religious group. From the point of view of the intervening actor, the
recruiter’s easier time spent screening is more than oset by the recruiter’s
increased amount of time spent training the individual who is selected. Civic
action aimed at improving economic conditions can now be seen as a clear
viable intervention. By similar logic, other types of intervention that unin-
tentionally hinder economic conditions will be at least partially undermined.
Direct action and attrition, should they unintentionally reduce the returns to
secular activities will ﬁnd their eorts partially or completely oset. Without
some civic action aimed at improving economic conditions, direct action and
attrition will be less eective than hoped.
Case 2: ? ?(high marginal cost of screening). This scenario
30is the opposite of Case 1. The recruiter now prefers a smaller group because
screening is so di!cult. Civic action aimed at improving economic conditions
will be less eective and may in fact increase suicide bombings. Indeed, civic
action that reduces the returns to secular activities will be more appropriate
because it leads to an increase in the size of the religious group, thereby making
it much more di!cult for the recruiter to identify good candidates. Moreover,
if a worsening of economics conditions is an indirect eect of direct action
and attrition, then the indirect eect may actually work in the favor of the
intervening actor.
O b s e r v et h a tm a n yo ft h ee ective interventions identiﬁed above match
the notion of preemptive (rather than deterrence) policies emphasized by Frey
and Luechinger (2003), Arce and Sandler (2005), and Faria and Arce (2005).
There are many such preemptive policies, and our analysis suggests that a
well-chosen mix of such policies will have the largest impact on the incidence
of suicide attacks. Our ﬁndings thus complement those in the literature.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper presents a model of terrorist recruitment from a religious group
in order to assess the viability of four types of counterterrorist intervention.
We use the model to demonstrate how various types of intervention may have
unintended consequences that work against the purposes of the intervention.
The model identiﬁes certain aspects of an ideal intervention. It would increase
all individuals’ secular opportunities, decrease their returns to religious group
participation, make it more di!cult for the recruiter to identify and train
31good candidates, and alter the make-up of the population so that there were
no individuals with both high human capital and high group capital. No
simple intervention does all of the above, so the optimal intervention is likely
to be a mix of dierent types of interventions.
We intend to push this work forward in many directions. First, our model
assumes that the religious group and recruiter are separate entities, but it
might be the case that they are the same or at least have similar preferences.
In this case, the recruiter might respond to an intervention by altering features
of the religious group (e.g., parameter G)t h a ta i di nt h ep r o d u c t i o no fs u i c i d e
bombers. This will put additional constraints on the intervening actor’s ability
to reduce the frequency of suicide bombers and may even change the policy
conclusions discussed earlier.
Second, we have not considered other relevant forms of heterogeneity in the
population. For example, it is reasonable to suppose that some individuals,
holding religious capital equal, are more susceptible to suicide bomber recruit-
ment than others. This can be added to the model as another dimension in
the individuals’ type space. The recruiter would then want to identify those
individuals with high religious and human capital and this other particular
trait.
Third, our analysis ignores the role that suicide bombings may play in com-
peting for resources. As discussed by various authors in Gambetta (2005), an
organization’s decision to use suicide bombings as a political or military tactic
depends in part on the degree of extremity of the group’s main constituents
such that groups with more radical constituents are more likely to use suicide
32bombers. Our model could be adapted to consider such a setting. The re-
cruiter’s resources may depend on the make-up of its constituents, and the
recruiter may have to compete with another recruiter or group for resources.
Indeed, Bloom (2005) argues that competition for resources between organi-
zations helps explain the proliferation of suicide bombings in Palestine. This
suggestions the incorporation of inter-group competition into the model.
Finally, our analysis considers only one intervening body. Having multiple
actors choosing interventions creates additional externalities in intervention
choice (e.g., Arce and Sandler 2005) and results in still more strategic com-
plexities (Bruck 2005).
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